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Abstract
We consider the role of the common prior for robust implementation in
an environment with interdependent values. Speci￿cally, we investigate
a model of public good provision which allows for negative and positive
informational externalities. In the corresponding direct mechanism, the
agents’ reporting strategies are strategic complements with negative infor-
mational externalities and strategic substitutes with positive informational
externalities.
We derive the necessary and su￿cient conditions for robust implemen-
tation in common prior type spaces and contrast this with our earlier
results without the common prior. In the case of strategic complements
the necessary and su￿cient conditions for robust implementation do not
depend on the existence of a common prior. In contrast, with strategic
substitutes, the implementation conditions are much weaker under the
common prior assumption.
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11 Introduction
We investigate the role of the common prior assumption in robust implemen-
tation. Robust implementation requires that every equilibrium on every type
space delivers outcomes consistent with a social choice function. By \every
type space", we allow for multiple copies of the same payo￿ type with di￿erent
beliefs over the types of others; and we allow for non common prior type spaces.
In this paper we want to look at an intermediate notion of robustness: allowing
all possible common prior type spaces.
We develop the arguments in the context of a public good model with in-
terdependent values. We have used this speci￿c public good model as a leading
example in our previous work on ex post implementation (see Bergemann and
Morris (2007b)), robust implementation in direct mechanisms (see Bergemann
and Morris (2007c)) and robust virtual implementation (see Bergemann and
Morris (2007d)). The current objective is to analyze the importance of the
common prior assumption for the possibility of robust implementation. In par-
ticular, we identify when the necessary and su￿cient conditions for robust im-
plementation depend on whether we allow for all types spaces (as in Bergemann
and Morris (2007c)) or only for all type spaces with a common prior. The public
good model allows for positive as well as negative informational externalities.
When we consider the direct revelation mechanism, we show that the reporting
strategies of the agents are strategic complements with negative informational
externalities and strategic substitutes with positive informational externalities.
The analysis of the robust implementation with and without a common
prior relies on epistemic results on incomplete information games. Branden-
burger and Dekel (1987) and Aumann (1987), respectively, reported formal
epistemic arguments which - for complete information games - characterize the
solution concepts of correlated equilibrium and rationalizability as the conse-
quences of common knowledge of rationality with and without the common
prior, respectively. In Bergemann and Morris (2007a), we report belief free
incomplete information generalizations of the solution concepts (incomplete in-
formation correlated equilibrium and incomplete information rationalizability),
2and their epistemic foundations; these solution concepts and results are vari-
ants/special cases of the work of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) and Forges
(1993) respectively. We apply these results to the direct mechanism design
setting where the strategy space is simply the payo￿ type space itself. In this
environment, a speci￿c message of a payo￿ type is incomplete information ra-
tionalizable if and only if there exists a type space and an interim equilibrium
such that the message is an equilibrium action for a type with a given payo￿
type in the type space. A similar result can be stated for the incomplete in-
formation correlated equilibrium. Namely, a message of a speci￿c payo￿ type
is an element of an incomplete information correlated equilibrium if and only
if there exists a type space with a common prior for which the speci￿c mes-
sage is an interim equilibrium action for a type with that payo￿ type. With
these epistemic results in the background, we can rephrase the conditions for ro-
bust implementation with and without common prior as establishing conditions
for a unique solution under incomplete information correlated equilibrium and
incomplete information rationalizability respectively. In the case of strategic
complements the necessary and su￿cient conditions for robust implementa-
tion do not depend on the existence of a common prior. In other words, with
strategic complements, if truthtelling is the unique incomplete information cor-
related equilibrium outcome, then truthtelling is also the unique incomplete
information rationalizable outcome. This re￿ects the well known property of
supermodular environments that multiple rationalizable outcomes occur only
when there are multiple equilibria (see, e.g., Milgrom and Roberts (1990)). In
contrast, with strategic substitutes, the common prior assumption changes the
implementation conditions. In particular, as the number of participating agents
in the public good model increases, the conditions for a unique rationalizable
outcome converge to requiring pure private values, whereas the conditions for
robust implementation with a common prior are independent of the number of
participating agents and accommodate moderate interdependence.
The public good example which we consider here has two notable features
which facilitate the analysis. First, the willingness to pay of agent i for the
3public good is the weighted sum of the payo￿ types of all the agents. The
valuation of agent i is therefore identi￿ed by an aggregator which summarizes
the private information of all agents in a one-dimensional variable. Second, the
cost function of the public good is quadratic and the resulting ex post incentive
compatible transfer of agent i is a quadratic function of the reports of the agents.
The quadratic payo￿ environment leads to a linear best response property which
allows us to analyze the reporting game in the direct mechanism as a potential
game. The analysis of the incomplete information correlated equilibrium is
then facilitated by using potential game arguments ￿rst developed by Neyman
(1997) for complete information games.
2 Setup
There are I agents. Player i has a payo￿ type ￿i 2 ￿i, where each ￿i = [0;1] is
a compact interval of the real line. Each agent gets utility from a social choice
x 2 X, where X is a compact set, and transfers ti 2 R; his utility is given by
ui (x;￿)￿ti. A direct mechanism speci￿es the social choice as a function of the
pro￿le of types, f : ￿ ! X, and a transfer rule for each agent, ti : ￿ ! R. Each





is ex post incentive compatible if for all i, ￿ and mi:
ui (f (￿i;￿￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) ￿ ti (￿i;￿￿i) ￿ ui (f (mi;￿￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) ￿ ti (mi;￿￿i):
A number of papers have described single crossing characterizations under
which ex post incentive compatible transfers exist (e.g., Dasgupta and Maskin
(2000), Bergemann and V￿ alim￿ aki (2002)). In this paper we focus on the case
where they exist. Agent i’s payo￿ if the true type pro￿le is ￿ and the announced
pro￿le is m is u+
i (m;￿) , ui (f (m);￿) ￿ ti (m). By construction, truthtelling
is an ex post equilibrium in the direct mechanism. We consider two solution
concepts for this setting. The ￿rst notion is incomplete information rationaliz-
ability.
De￿nition 1 (Incomplete Information Rationalizability)
The incomplete information rationalizable actions R = (Ri)
I
i=1, each Ri : ￿i !
42￿i￿
?, are de￿ned recursively as follows. Let R0
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The second notion is the incomplete information version of the correlated
equilibrium.
De￿nition 2 (Incomplete Information Correlated Equilibrium )
A probability distribution ￿ 2 ￿(￿ ￿ ￿) is an incomplete information corre-
lated equilibrium (ICE) of the direct mechanism if for each i and each measur-









We de￿ne Ci (￿i) - the set of messages that can be played by type ￿i in
an incomplete information correlated equilibrium of the direct mechanism. We
will say that m￿
i 2 Ci (￿￿
i) if for each " > 0, there exists an ICE ￿ with
￿[f(m;￿)jmi 2 [￿￿
i ￿ ";￿￿
i + "] and ￿i 2 [￿￿
i ￿ ";￿￿
i + "]g] > 0:
In Bergemann and Morris (2007a) we report the above solution concepts in
a general game theoretic environment. We observe that the solution concepts
Ri (￿i) and Ci (￿i) are \belief free" solution concepts in the sense that they do
not refer to a speci￿c common prior or speci￿c beliefs or higher order beliefs of
the agents. Rather, they represent the sets of actions which can be observed
as rationalizable or correlated equilibrium actions for some beliefs of agent i
given his payo￿ type ￿i. In Bergemann and Morris (2007a), we show that
incomplete information rationalizability and correlated equilibrium share the
same epistemic properties as their complete information equivalents as outlined
5in the introduction. With these belief free notions in place, there is no further
need to refer to beliefs and higher order beliefs of agent i. In consequence, we
shall from now on refer to the payo￿ type ￿i simply as the type ￿i of agent i.
3 A Public Good Example
We discuss the role and the importance of the common prior for robust imple-
mentation in a public good example with interdependent values. In the ￿nal
section, we discuss which special properties of the environment are used in es-
tablishing our results. We consider the provision of a public good x 2 R+. The
utility of each agent i for the public good is given by ui (x;￿) = hi (￿)￿x; where
each




aggregates the agents’ payo￿ types. Thus the utility of agent i depends on
his own type with weight one and the types of the other agents with a weight
￿ 2 R. The weight ￿ represents the preference interdependence among the
agents. If ￿ = 0, we have a private values model, while ￿ < 0 represents
negative informational externalities and ￿ > 0 represents positive informational
externalities. The cost of establishing the public good is given by c(x) = 1
2x2.
The planner must choose x to maximize social welfare, i.e., the sum of gross
utilities minus the cost of the public good. The socially optimal level of the
public good is therefore equal to:




The generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) transfers are given by:











The transfers fti (￿)gI
i=1 of the generalized VCG mechanism guarantee that
truthtelling is an ex post incentive compatible strategy as long as ￿ ￿ ￿1=(I ￿ 1).
6If the (negative) externality ￿ falls below this threshold, then the single crossing
condition ceases to hold.
Within the generalized VCG mechanism, we can de￿ne for every agent i an
ex post best response as a mapping from the true payo￿ types of all agents and
the reported types of all agents but i into a report of agent i: bi : ￿￿￿￿i ! ￿i.
The net payo￿ of agent i, given that he has type ￿i, but reports himself to be of
type mi and that he has a point conjecture that other agents have type pro￿le















The ex post best response of agent i is simply the solution to the ￿rst order
condition of the above payo￿ function with respect to mi:
bi (￿;m￿i) , ￿i + ￿
X
j6=i
(￿j ￿ mj). (4)
In other words, the best response by i to a (mis)report m￿i by the other agents
is to report a type so that the aggregate type from his point of view is exactly
identical to the true aggregate type (under the aggregation function hi (￿) of
agent i) generated by the true type pro￿le ￿. We note that the above calculation
also veri￿es the strict ex post incentive compatibility of f, since setting mi = ￿i
is a best response if mj = ￿j for all j 6= i.
Whether there are strategic complements or substitutes plays an impor-
tant role in determining the role of the common prior in implementation. We
say that the strategies of i and j are strategic complements if 8i;j;8￿;8m:
@bi (￿;mj;m￿ij)=@mj > 0, and they are strategic substitutes if 8i;j;8￿;8m:
@bi (￿;mj;m￿ij)=@mj < 0. Given the best response (4), it follows that the re-
ports of the agents are strategic complements if there are negative informational
externalities (￿ < 0) and strategic substitutes if there a positive informational
externalities (￿ > 0).
Bergemann and Morris (2007c) showed that if interdependence is small,
i.e. ￿ 2 (￿ 1
I￿1;+ 1
I￿1), then truthtelling is the unique rationalizable outcome
(i.e., for all i and ￿i; Ri (￿i) = f￿ig); but if the interdependence is large, i.e.
7￿ = 2 (￿ 1
I￿1;+ ￿ 1
I￿1), then any message is rationalizable (i.e., for all i and
￿i; Ri (￿i) = [0;1]). We refer the reader to Bergemann and Morris (2007c)
for a formal statement and the derivation of this result. There, we present
necessary and su￿cient conditions for robust implementation in environments
where, for each agent i, the payo￿ types of all agents can be aggregated in a
one-dimensional variable. The environment is general in the sense that neither
the aggregator nor the utility function of each agent i has to be linear as in
the current example. We show that robust implementation is possible in any
mechanism if and only if it is possible in the direct mechanism; and we show
that robust implementation is possible if and only if the aggregator function
satis￿es a contraction property that reduces to the condition of a small ￿ with
￿ 2 (￿ 1
I￿1;+ 1
I￿1).
In this note, we contrast the uniqueness result with incomplete informa-
tion rationalizability with the incomplete information correlated equilibrium
case. We use results regarding the uniqueness of the incomplete information
correlated equilibrium in potential games derived in Bergemann and Morris







i=1g has a weighted potential v : A ￿ ￿ ! R if
there exists w 2 RI
++ such that

















for all i, ai;a0
i 2 Ai, a￿i 2 Ai and ￿ 2 ￿. This is an incomplete informa-
tion generalization of the de￿nition of a weighted potential in Monderer and
Shapley (1996); in particular, it is equivalent to requiring that each complete
information game (ui (￿;￿))
I
i=1 is a weighted potential game in the sense of
Monderer and Shapley (1996), using the same weights for each ￿ 2 ￿. We say
that v is a strictly concave potential if v (￿;￿) is a strictly concave function of
a for all ￿ 2 ￿. In Bergemann and Morris (2007a) we show that if ￿ has a
strictly concave smooth potential function and an ex post equilibrium s￿, then
8i;8￿i; s￿
i (￿i) = Ci (￿i): In the direct mechanism, the set of actions is the set
of types. We argued earlier that the direct mechanism has truthtelling as an ex
post equilibrium provided that ￿ ￿ ￿1=(I ￿ 1). By the result in Bergemann
8and Morris (2007a), the su￿ciency condition for a unique correlated equilib-
rium can then be established by verifying that there exists a potential of the
direct mechanism which is strictly concave.
Proposition 1 (Incomplete Information Correlated Equilibrium)
The set of incomplete information correlated equilibrium actions for all i and
￿i is Ci (￿i) = f￿ig if and only if ￿ 2 (￿ 1
I￿1;1).
Proof. We ￿rst establish the su￿ciency result. We consider the following
function v (m;￿) as a potential function for the direct mechanism:
v (m;￿) = ￿
I X
i=1




The partial derivative of the function v (m;￿) with respect to mi is:
@v
@mi
(m;￿) = ￿2(mi ￿ ￿i) ￿ 2￿
X
j6=i
(mj ￿ ￿j); (5)






2, if j = i;
￿1
2￿, if j 6= i:
(6)
It follows from (6) that v (m;￿) is a potential function and it follows from
(5) and the ex post best response (4) that v is a potential for the belief free
incomplete information game ￿ with type and person independent weights wi =
1=2. Finally, as v (m;￿) is a quadratic function, the (constant) Hessian H is
given by (6). With elementary linear algebra, we can now verify that H is
negative semi-de￿nite if and only if ￿ 1
I￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 and that H is negative
de￿nite if ￿ 1
I￿1 < ￿ < 1. Now the potential function is strictly concave if and
only if its Hessian H is negative de￿nite, which establishes the result.
The necessity result follows from the best response function (4). It su￿ces
to show that for ￿ ￿ 1, there exist complete information correlated equilibria









. Consider the following correlated
9equilibrium ￿ with ￿((0;1;^ ￿3;::;^ ￿I);(1
2; 1
2;^ ￿3;::;^ ￿I)) = 1. It is easy to verify
that the equilibrium conditions (4) will be satis￿ed at ￿. We observe that for
￿ > 1, the equilibrium condition (4) will be corner solution and hence there will
be strict inequalities for i = 1;2.
Taken together, our results in Bergemann and Morris (2007c) and the above
proposition show how the common prior assumption has a major impact on the
possibility of robust implementation with positive interdependence (and thus
strategic substitutes), but no impact with negative interdependence (and thus
strategic complementarities). Thus the following corollary is an immediate
consequence of Bergemann and Morris (2007c) and proposition 1:
Corollary 1 (Robust Implementation)
1. If the reports are strategic complements, then robust implementation with
common prior implies robust implementation without common prior.
2. If the reports are strategic substitutes, then robust implementation with
common prior fails to imply robust implementation without common prior.
The public good example shows how large the gap between robust imple-
mentation with or without common prior can be. In particular, as the number
of agents increases, essentially only the private value model with ￿ = 0 can be
robustly implemented without a common prior, but the interdependent model
can be robustly implemented with a common prior for all ￿ < 1. This shows
that the role of the common prior is critical in many mechanism design envi-
ronments and for our understanding of robust implementation.
4 Discussion
Strategic Complements and Strategic Substitutes In the linear best
response environment of the public good problem, the notions of strategic com-
plement and strategic substitute emerged directly from the best response. In
general environments with di￿erentiable mechanisms, the link between the in-
formation externality and the strategic properties of the reports remain to hold.
10For preciseness, if we assume the following supermodularity conditions to sup-
port ex post incentive compatibility, @f=@￿i > 0; @2ui=@x@￿i > 0, then locally
at truthful reporting, the strategies of the agents are strategic substitutes if
@2ui=@x@￿j > 0 and strategic complements if @2ui=@x@￿j < 0.
Potential and Mechanism Design Our proof that there is a unique in-




used the fact that we could construct a potential function for the
direct mechanism. This turns out to be a very strong property. In a di￿er-
entiable environment, it is straightforward to show that a su￿cient condition
for Bayesian potential games is that the cross derivatives of the agent i and j
equalizes at every true and reported type pro￿le. While the cross derivative is
equal to zero in the current linear quadratic environment (because f is linear),
we lose that property even if we replace the quadratic cost function with a
general concave cost function. It remains an open question to identify a larger
class of environments where the potential argument goes through.
Jehiel, Meyer-Ter-Vehn, and Moldovanu (2007) have used potential argu-
ments to characterize when ex post incentive compatible transfers exist. Their
de￿nition of the potential function implicitly assumes that the agents are telling
the truth and thus - as Jehiel, Meyer-Ter-Vehn, and Moldovanu (2007) note -
this is a much weaker requirement than the requirement that the direct mech-
anism be a potential game.
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